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Q&A: Arguments for Advancing Russia-African Relations – Modern Diplomacy

  • December 2, 2021
  • 28 min read
Q&A: Arguments for Advancing Russia-African Relations – Modern Diplomacy

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As preparations are underway for the second Russia-Africa summit planned for 2022, African leaders, politicians, academic researchers and experts have been discussing several aspects of the current state of Russia-Africa relations. They, most often, compare it with a number of foreign countries notably China, the United States, European Union, India, France, Turkey, Japan, and South Korea that have held such gatherings in that format with Africa.
Some have convincingly argued that Russia has moved away from its low-key strategy to vigorous relations, as shown by the first symbolic Russia-Africa summit in the Black Sea city of Sochi in October 2019. Russia and Africa adopted a joint declaration, a comprehensive document that outlines the key objectives and necessary tasks that seek to raise assertively the entirety of relations to a new level.
Long before the summit, at least, during the past decade, several bilateral agreements between Russia and individual African countries were signed. Besides, memoranda of understanding, declaration of interests, pledges and promises dominated official speeches. On the other side, Russia is simply invisible in economic sectors in Africa, despite boasting of decades-old solid relations with the continent.
Undoubtedly, Africa is opening up new fields of opportunity. The creation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provides a unique and valuable opportunity for businesses to access an integrated African market of over 1.3 billion people with a GDP of over US$2.5 trillion. It aspires to connect all the regions of Africa, to deepen economic integration and to boost intra-African trade and investment.
Despite existing risks, challenges and threats, a number of external countries continue strengthening their economic footholds in Africa and contribute enormously towards the continent’s efforts to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Russia has to upgrade or scale up its collaborative engagement with Africa. It has to consider seriously launching more public outreach programmes, especially working with civil society to change public perceptions and the private sector to strengthen its partnership with Africa. In order to achieve this, it has to surmount the challenges, take up the courage and work consistently with both private and public sectors and with an effective Action Plan.
In this exclusive interview with Steven Gruzd, Head of the African Governance and Diplomacy Programme at the at the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA), discusses a few questions, highlights existing challenges and passionately offers some progressive suggestions regarding Russia-African relations.
Steven Gruzd also heads the Russia-Africa Research Programme initiated this year at SAIIA, South Africa’s premier research institute on international issues. It is an independent, non-government think tank, with a long and proud history of providing thought leadership in Africa. Here are the interview excerpts:
What are your appreciations and fears for Russia returning to Africa?
Africa is becoming crowded, with many old and new actors actively involved on the continent. Apart from EU countries, China and the US, we have players such as Iran, Turkey, Israel, the UAE, Japan and others. So Russia’s renewed interest in Africa does not happen in isolation. It, of course, seeks to build on Soviet-era ties, and several African leaders today studied in the USSR or the Soviet sphere of influence. Russia has tended to focus on niche areas such as weapons sales, nuclear energy and resource extraction, at a much smaller scale than China. Many leaders are welcoming the attention of Russia, but some remain wary of Russia’s hidden motives and intentions. Russia’s dealings are not transparent and open compared to China. The shadowy world of private military companies such as Russia’s Wagner Group is causing concern in unstable countries like the CAR, Libya and Mali. So, in fact, there is a kind of mixed picture, sentiments and interpretations are also varied here.
How would you argue that Russia engages fairly in “competition for cooperation” in Africa?
Africa is a busy geopolitical arena, with many players operating. Russia has to compete against them, and distinctively remain focused its efforts. Russia welcomes diplomatic support from African countries, and unlike the West, it does not demand good governance or advocate for human rights reforms. Russia likes to portray itself as not interfering in local politics or judging African countries, even though there is mounting evidence that it has been involved in meddling in elections in Africa through disinformation, fake news and attempting to exploit fault lines in societies through social media.
Do you think, to some extent, Russia is fighting neo-colonial tendencies, as shown in Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan? Does it imply that Russia supports military leaders in Africa?
Russia uses the rhetoric of anti-colonialism in its engagement with Africa, and that it is fighting neo-colonialism from the West, especially in relations with their former colonies. It sees France as a threat to its interests especially in Francophone West Africa, the Maghreb and the Sahel. Russia has invested resources in developing French-language news media, and engages in anti-French media activity, including through social media. I think Russia has its own economic and political interests in countries like Guinea, Mali, CAR and Sudan, even if it uses the language of fighting neo-colonialism. It explicitly appears that Russia supports several undemocratic African leaders and their regimes.
Some experts have argued that Russia’s diplomacy is full of bilateral agreements, largely not implemented, and gamut of pledges and promises. What are your views about these?
I would largely agree that there is a divide between what has been pledged and promised at high-level meetings and summits, compared to what has actually materialised on the ground. There is more talk than action, and in most cases down the years mere intentions and ideas have been officially presented as initiatives already in progress. It will be interesting to see what has been concretely achieved in reports at the second Russia-Africa summit scheduled for late 2022.
From the above discussions so far, what do you think are Russia’s challenges and setbacks in Africa?
Africa is a crowded playing field. Russia does not have the same resources and approaches as China, France, UK or US, so it has limited impact. The language barrier could be used as an excuse, but Russia has the great possibility to leverage into the Soviet- and Russian-trained diaspora. On the other hand, Russia feels it is unfairly portrayed in Western media, so that is another perception it seeks to change. It can change the perception by supporting public outreach programmes. Working closely with the academic community, such as the South African Institute of International Affairs and similar ones throughout Africa, is one potential instrument to raise its public image. In places like Mozambique and the CAR, the Wagner Group left after incurring human losses – does Russia have staying power?
As it prepares to hold the second Russia-Africa summit in 2022, what could be the expectations for Africa? What to do ultimately with the first Joint Declaration from Sochi?
As already mentioned, there needs to be a lot of tangible progress on the ground for the second summit to show impact. It is worth to reiterate here that African countries will expect more debt relief and solid investment from Russian businesses. In terms of political support at places like the UN Security Council, there is close interaction between Russia and African States, but as recent research by SAIIA shows, not as much as assumed. The relationship has to however deliver, and move from words to deeds. In conclusion, I would suggest that Russia has to take up both the challenges and unique opportunities, and attempt to scale up its influence by working consistently on practical multifaceted sustainable development issues and by maintaining appreciable relations with Africa. And African countries likewise have to devise viable strategies for engaging with Russia.
Nigeria’s role in ECOWAS peacekeeping
MD Africa Editor Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent researcher and writer on African affairs in the EurAsian region and former Soviet republics. He wrote previously for African Press Agency, African Executive and Inter Press Service. Earlier, he had worked for The Moscow Times, a reputable English newspaper. Klomegah taught part-time at the Moscow Institute of Modern Journalism. He studied international journalism and mass communication, and later spent a year at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He co-authored a book “AIDS/HIV and Men: Taking Risk or Taking Responsibility” published by the London-based Panos Institute. In 2004 and again in 2009, he won the Golden Word Prize for a series of analytical articles on Russia’s economic cooperation with African countries.
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What a Successful Summit for Democracy Looks Like from Africa
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ECOWAS is the 44-year-old economic community of West African states. “The evolution of ECOWAS from the level of an organization created for the purpose of economic integration to the level of organizations that makes and implements decisions of a political and economic nature at the international level deserves quite close attention of researchers today.” [2]
As with any alliance, ECOWAS has the undisputed leader – Nigeria. Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. It should be noted that for many years it was dominated by a military regime, during which the country was in mismanagement and in disorder. Even under military rule, Nigeria has made a significant contribution to the work of ECOWAS to restore democratic governance and ensure stability in many West African countries. This can be attributed to an attempt by “Nigeria to convince the international community of its determination to return to democratic rule and refrain from participating in difficult West African conflicts.” [5]
Due to the strategic position, Nigeria plays an important role in realizing the goals and objectives of ECOWAS. First, “Nigeria has a positive balance of payments, because the country exports large quantities of oil and oil products, as well as cocoa and many valuable metals and alloys.” [1] The second reason is Nigeria’s partners, who make a great contribution to the country’s economy by being its investors. Another important factor is the fact that Nigeria mainly imports high-tech products, without participating in the international exchange of technologies.
At the time of Nigeria’s accession to ECOWAS, the government marked for itself several directions of its activities, being a member of this organization. In the first place, particular attention was paid to adherence to the ECOWAS economic integration framework, as this contributed to the promotion of free trade. In addition, Nigeria has sought to introduce a single currency for the region. The goal of expanding the infrastructural development of the automobile, railway, telecommunications, energy, gas pipeline industries was also important, which, as a result, should have increased agricultural and industrial production.
Thus, it can be concluded that the need for ECOWAS in Nigeria is great because Nigeria, owning financial and human resources, can help the organization achieve its long-term goal of full integration of the region.
According to the Vice President of the World Bank L. Sabib, “Nigeria can become a locomotive capable of promoting the economy of West Africa. This has not yet been done due to poor governance, ineffective government, corruption and political instability”. [5]
Since the establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975, Nigeria has focused on the foreign policy of the West African region. In many ways, this decision allowed it to become one of the decisive forces of this regional organization, not to mention its advantages in its size, geographic location and, of course, economic potential.
Professor Akintola is confident that “Africa has been the focus of Nigeria’s foreign policy since independence, with an emphasis on the liberation, development and unity of Africans both inside and outside the continent.” [3] This confirms that Nigeria continues to dominate the rest of West African states, which allows it to play an important role in the activities of ECOWAS.
Many researchers highlight the contribution of Nigeria to the regional integration of the ECOWAS organization. Moreover, this activity is a priority for Nigeria in matters of its foreign policy. This is most clearly manifested in the processes of maintaining peace and economic liberalization.
Between 1975 and 1993, Nigeria revised its foreign policy in many ways. This was largely due to the formation of ECOWAS, since the country was striving to significantly increase its weight in this alliance. It should be noted that the change in Nigeria’s policy is closely related to changes in ECOWAS. At the beginning of its work (1975) ECOWAS set itself the task of becoming a collective security organization, but in 1990 the goal was rethought. It was decided to stimulate the development of collective security, and this decision was reflected in Chapter 8 of the UN Charter. [4]
Nigeria especially showed the importance of its participation in integration during the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone as part of ECOMOG. When Nigeria assumed the role of the dominant country in the organization of ECOWAS, its foreign policy choice was extremely obvious – a peacekeeping strategy.
Speaking about the contribution of Nigeria to the Liberian conflict, it should be said that its participation did not give any guarantees of successful peacekeeping. However, Nigeria’s involvement continued to be critical to the operation. Without Nigerian troops, supplies and air support, ECOMOG forces would have lost many more soldiers and civilians and would most likely be driven out of the country entirely by the factions. Nigeria provided significant military support to ECOMOG, but the motives behind this support hindered ceasefire agreements and further negotiations for a transitional government and elections. Although Nigeria has acquired a certain regional prestige for its actions, it has also generated opposition to its dominant status from neighboring African states.
Nigeria faced major challenges in its efforts to restore peace and security to Sierra Leone with ECOMOG. In addition to financial problems, the lack of support from the citizens of Sierra Leone has also affected the main aspects of peacekeeping in the country. Despite the challenges faced by the Nigerian government and the country’s unstable economic situation, Nigeria was able to continue its mission, which was believed to be in line with the country’s foreign policy goals of ensuring peace and security in the subregion and Africa as a whole. Despite the enormous government spending and corruption associated with Nigeria’s mission to Sierra Leone, the mission remains one of the most successful African initiatives to promote peace and security abroad.
The role of Nigeria in the implementation of the ECOWAS plans cannot be overestimated because it has the status of a regional leader in ECOWAS, which indicates its serious contribution to the processes of regional integration and the maintenance of peace and security in West Africa 
References
1.      Asiagba John Chinedu. Nigeria as a member of the Economic Community of West African States, p. 261.
2.      ECOWAS. Regional integration problems. Managing editor A.Y. Elez. Moscow., IAfr RAN., 2016.p. 5
3.      Geveling, L.V. Foreign experience in fighting corruption: Federal Republic of Nigeria / L.V. Geveling // Institute of Municipal Administration. – 2012.- № 3.- p. 98-102.
4.      Omo. O. O. Dennis. Nigeria in the Process of Regional Integration in West Africa: The Case of ECOWAS. Moscow,2018., p. 67.
5.      Speech delivered by World Bank Vice President Louis Sabib, state visits to Nigeria // The Guardian Newspaper. Lagos, 1998 September 21.
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The Biden administration is wrapping up preparations for its Summit for Democracy, to be held virtually next month. While the list of invitees is now clear, what is not yet clear is what success for the Summit looks like – overall and for each region of the globe. Here, I outline concrete ways the Summit could help advance democracy in Africa.
To be realistic, success should be defined at the individual country level and consider the history and context of each one. However, for the purposes of this paper I will focus on sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and what common hopes we have with regards to democracy success across the continent.
The State of Democracy in Africa
It is now a cliché’ to say that democracy is in retreat in Africa. Evidence for this appears strong and includes back-sliding in Ethiopia and Sudan, two countries that held out hope for a democratic awakening.  In addition, recent coups in Guinea, Chad, and Mali provided further evidence of back-sliding. Closing and closed political spaces in Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Cameroon and Zimbabwe (among others) do not provide much in the way of hope.  During the past 18 months COVID-19 has provided fertile ground for autocracy and has led to economic deterioration and further restricted political space.
On the other hand, Africa is the world’s youngest continent. According to the latest “World Values Survey”, those holding “emancipative” (i.e. democratic) values are far and away higher than those holding more autocratic values.  The older generation of autocratic leaders such as President Museveni in Uganda is facing a population representing values at odds with those of the political leadership.   While autocratic values currently hold sway throughout the continent, one can conclude that these represent “eddies” in a river which largely represents more democratic values. Consequently, we should counsel patience and not condone pessimism over the long-term.
Making Progress through Summit Commitments
Success will not be a static end-point or destination or some far-flung and unattainable goal that is unrealistic.  It will represent a series of actions or steps among a variety of actors in each society that are on a journey toward a democratic future. These actors, explained in detail below, include political parties, civil society, and legislative bodies. We must be modest in our assumptions around success given the slow vicissitudes of progress. Modest progress is still progress, particularly given the direction in which many countries are headed (at least over the short-term).
Successful political parties aggregate, communicate and advocate for the wishes and hopes of their members.  Ideally, they are not based on the charisma of a leader, nor does a good party represent only the needs of a specific group, such as an ethnic group. Unfortunately, across the continent the evidence points to nearly all political parties serving as a vehicle for a particular leader’s wish to obtain high office.  Political parties exist for their leaders instead of serving as a vehicle to promote a particular set of policies advocated by their constituents.  As a result, traditionally marginalized groups such as women and youth are rarely given real leadership roles within political parties. Witness the situation in Sudan where women and youth were the vanguard of a revolution but were then marginalized within political parties vying for power in the new transitional government.  We must be realistic and patient when addressing the question of what democracy would look like vis-à-vis the upcoming Summit for Democracy. The longer-term goal of ideologically based, inclusive, participatory, and transparent political parties is a worthy one.  To realize these goals, the U.S. and its allies should commit to the following:
Civil society organizations (CSOs) are key actors in all societies. We have seen that where CSOs are trained and motivated they can have a significant impact holding governments and legislative bodies accountable.  For example, CSOs provided electoral observation during the Ethiopian elections to ensure that Ethiopia’s first democratic elections were conducted according to international and regional standards. In the Gambia, CSOs advocated to the government to pass legislation to provide citizens access to information and succeeded in court in suing the electoral commission (IEC) over voter registration anomalies.  Despite successes, several factors will need to be addressed for their contribution to democracy to be sustained and amplified. This includes CSOs working together in coalitions that magnify their power and scope.  Working alone on sensitive issues in often restricted contexts rarely produces lasting success. Learning the skills of networking with other CSOs will be critical to fulfill the promises of democracy.
To realize these goals, the U.S. and its allies should commit to the following: 
Legislative bodies throughout Africa are largely rubber-stamp institutions that do the bidding of the countries’ leadership. They rarely perform their traditional role as an independent branch of government that represents the people they were elected to serve.  IRI’s own work found that many members of legislatures do not even understand their role with regards to oversight of the executive branch, outreach to constituents, legislative processes, and budgetary oversight. Consequently, we must be realistic about what can be accomplished and take small steps to train legislators about their roles. 
To realize these goals, the U.S. and its allies should commit to the following:
Looking Forward
An opportunity now exists to change the narrative that democracy is in decline. Africa’s youthful population, its increasing levels of education and better access to information are all factors pointing to more democracy; not less. Recent democratic victories in Malawi and Zambia, coupled with strong opposition and protest movements in Sudan, Guinea, and Chad portend further gains. To sustain these gains, institutions that represent citizens, including political parties, legislative bodies, and civil society must be strengthened. Autocratic governments, some in power for more than 30 years, will not easily give up power. As a result, both public and private institutions must be resilient and have the skills necessary to thrive in restricted environments. The Summit for Democracy can highlight gains made, to provide support to those working in restricted environments, and to provide resources to continue building the capabilities of democracy’s institutions. 
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The conditions of convening (the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation “FOCAC”) on November 29-30, 2021, in the Senegalese capital, “Dakar”, reflect the challenges faced by the two parties after the spread of the conditions of the Corona pandemic “Covid-19”. We find here that the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation “FOCAC” has inaugurated on October 2000 in a move that is in line with the requirements of the times, and reflects the common desire of the Chinese and African peoples to achieve peace, development and cooperation under the new circumstances. Over the course of more than 21 years, since the establishment of this forum, the cooperation mechanism between the Chinese and African parties has continuously developed, and made important achievements. This eighth ministerial meeting is held to review all opportunities for China-Africa cooperation, to open new horizons for the China-Africa strategic partnership and to emphasize the establishment of the (China-Africa Free Trade Area). The two sides will have to work out a future plan for cooperation between them in the next stage, to lay solid foundations for a new and greater development of China-Africa relations post (Covid-19) pandemic.
   So, the Egyptian researcher can identify the main objectives for helding the the (Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation “FOCAC”) on November 29-30, 2021, and the main agenda, planning and pledges for the benefits of the African continent and its people, as follows:
First: Agenda of the Eighth Ministerial Conference of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
   Therefore, the most prominent points on the agenda are the fruitful cooperation and continuous support between the countries of the African continent and China. China is the largest developing country in the world, while Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries.  Hence, we find that the most prominent areas of current cooperation between the Chinese and African sides, are:
 1- Strengthen strategic alignment and political coordination and advance China-Africa cooperation in building the “Belt and Road”.
 2- Linking the “Belt and Road Initiative to the African Union Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development of the United Nations” closely with all development strategies of African countries.
 3- Giving priority to the implementation of (the eight goals of China-Africa cooperation), which are:
(industrial development, enterprise connectivity, trade facilitation and green development, capacity building, health, public communication, and peace and security)
  This will surely increase the opportunities and impetus for China-Africa cooperation.
 4- Focusing on deepening the Sino-African partnership (as an important part of South-South cooperation), and these relations bring opportunities for Africa to add a new dynamism to the global economy.
 5- The China-Africa Cooperation Forum plays a greater role in (fighting poverty – raising Africa’s capacity for self-development – developing the green economy – enhancing human communication between the two parties).
 6- The African Union, with the support of the United Nations, works resolutely for cooperation between China and Africa, and makes joint efforts with both sides to achieve (permanent peace, development and prosperity in the world, especially the developing countries).
 7- The Chinese and African sides unanimously agree on (cooperation, win-win and common development), with the Chinese side continuing to adhere to the concept of transparency, justice and mutual benefit, and working with the African side to enhance mutual trust between China and Africa, thus pushing the relations of partnership and comprehensive strategic cooperation between China and Africa to progress in a more depth and effectiveness way, with steady and continuous steps.
    In this way, it can be considered that China-Africa cooperation as a model of international partnership is part of international cooperation with Africa, which adheres to the criteria of (mutual benefit and win-win, openness and inclusiveness, learning from each other, employing the advantages of each and uniting efforts, jointly contributing to peace and development in Africa). Therefore, the Chinese strategy is based on respecting the sovereignty of African countries, listening to their views, paying attention to their positions, and fulfilling promises towards them.
 Second: The most prominent areas of China-Africa cooperation Forum within the framework of the “FOCAC”
   There are many areas of cooperation between China and the countries of the African continent within the framework of joint efforts with the “Forum on China-Africa Cooperation” FOCAC, and the most prominent areas of China-Africa cooperation, are:
First: Expanding cooperation in (investment and financing fields to help Africa achieve sustainable development). In this context, China pledged to provide $60 billion in loans to African countries to develop the infrastructure, agriculture, manufacturing, and small and medium-sized businesses sectors in Africa.
Second: Continuing to increase aid to Africa, including humanitarian and medical aid, after (Covid-19), so that the African peoples benefit from the fruits of development.  Hence, China will work to (increase the number of model centers for agricultural technology in Africa, train 30,000 Africans) in various specialties, provide thousands of government scholarships, and send 1,500 doctors from its medical missions to help eradicate epidemics and combat endemic diseases, viruses, Ebola and the coronavirus, as well as helping African countries build meteorological infrastructure and protect and manage forests.
Third: Supporting the African integration process to help the continent raise its development capacity.  In this context, China has established with Africa (Partnership Relations and Cooperation in the Implementation of Cross-Border and Regional Infrastructure Projects).
Fourth: Consolidating the friendship between the Chinese people and the African peoples to lay solid popular foundations for the common Sino-African development, by inviting China to launch the “Chinese-African People’s Friendship Campaign”, establish the “China-Africa Media Exchange Center” in China, and continue to implement the “Sino-African Joint Research Programme”.
Fifth: Strengthening peace and stability in Africa to create a secure environment for development in Africa.  This is through China’s launch of the “China-Africa Partnership and Cooperation Initiative to Strengthen Peace and Security”, and the Chinese government’s training of more African Union officials in (the field of peace and security affairs, conflict avoidance, development and peacekeeping).
     Accordingly, we can arrive at an important analysis, which is that the launch of the Sino-African development initiatives for cooperation within the framework of the “FOCAC Forum on China-Africa Cooperation” comes within the framework of the strategy of “South-South” cooperation efforts, as an exemplary cooperation between the Sino-African parties, especially with (the prominent role of Chinese banks and companies in financing and building power stations, railways, highways and ports, as well as communications infrastructure, fiber-optic cables and smart cities in African countries), and if these Chinese initiatives continue to implement their goals, China will be able to stimulate global and then African economic growth  China will meet the needs of developing countries for the long term.
Third: Evaluating the model and experience of the Ministerial Meeting and Sino-African Cooperation “FOCAC”
   By evaluating the model of China-Africa ministerial cooperation, the leaders of the Chinese and African sides have reached important consensus on all important issues with their unified voices. Therefore, the previous summits and ministerial meetings between China and the African Union were crowned with complete success and bore abundant fruits, and recorded a new historical page for Chinese-African relations, and formed (a new modern milestone for the model of South-South cooperation).  Among the most important messages, achievements and experience gained from previous ministerial meetings and summits between China and Africa,  as follows:
 1) We find the interest of the leaders of the Chinese and African sides to hold intense bilateral meetings or reciprocal meetings and visits, with the keenness of a number of leaders of African countries and governments to visit China (to exchange views in depth on bilateral relations and issues of common interest, especially those related to trade issues and joint investments between the two parties).
  2) Although more than 21 years have passed since the establishment of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum, it came in line with the trend of the times and developed with the progress of China-Africa cooperation, and it has become more mature and complete with the passage of time, and it has become (a landmark for international cooperation with Africa and a model for South-South cooperation).  .
 3) Here, the “Eighth Ministerial Meeting of Africa and China” aims to strengthen the comprehensive strategic partnership and cooperation relations between China and Africa from a new historical perspective, and open a new historical path for it, with joint efforts made to activate and strengthen the (China-Africa Cooperation Forum), and for (implementation of the outcomes of the summit of the previous “FOCAC” to support cooperation with Beijing in a comprehensive and effective manner, bringing (tangible benefits to the peoples of the Chinese and African sides).
 4) When we evaluate the most important measures taken by the Chinese government in the eighth ministerial meeting, in addition to the previous meetings that brought China together with African leaders and at the level of ministerial meetings, we find that they are represented in (five priority areas for China and Africa), revolving mainly around: strengthening peace and development in Africa, and pushing forward the China-Africa strategic partnership to new forms for the new era.
  What is remarkable about this in most of the previous ministerial meetings and summits between China and the countries of the African continent, is the great Chinese interest in the development of African human resources, and the great Chinese welcome to receive African delegations, most of whose members are young people to be trained in various fields, and it has (exceeded the total number of Africans who received trainings in China to almost 5,000 students, compared to just dozens of students before the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation).
   If trade is one of the most important indicators of the development and strength of the relationship between the Chinese and African sides, the growth of the volume of trade exchange between the Chinese and African sides is a testament to the great boost witnessed by Chinese-African relations in recent years.
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